In her reflections on violence, Hannah Arendt famously remarked that "violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it" (1970, 56) . This is a powerful insight which clashes, however, with an equally powerful idea: that violence and repression "work" to gen erate compliance. This article analyzes uniquely detailed local data from the Vietnam War to adjudicate between these contradictory insights. Specifically, it examines how aerial bombing against civilian targets affected the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency's ability to control the population of South Vietnam.
A military strategy that depends heavily upon popu lar mobilization, insurgency makes the control of civilians a central objective. Consequently, military engagements frequently occur in populated areas, leading to "collateral" civilian casualties. Insurgents' failure to clearly identify themselves as combatants makes it difficult for counterin surgents to discriminate in the use of lethal violence. For these reasons, counterinsurgency tends to kill many civil ians. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) show that the mass killing of civilians has been significantly more common since World War II in guerrilla wars than in wars fought by conventional means.1 Aerial bombing has been an important counterin surgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology. Bombing was used by the British to suppress Kurdish uprisings in Iraq following World War I (McDowall 1996) and against rebel tribes in Waziristan during the 1920s (Peck 1928) The global prevalence of counterinsurgent violence against civilians points to its utility. Yet the conventional wisdom among contemporary scholars says that victim izing civilians is futile, at best, or even counterproductive.
instance, General Stanley McChrystal made the reduction of civilian casualties a major focus of his counterinsur gency strategy as commander of the ISAF in Afghanistan (Hastings 2010) . This apparent consensus is belied by im portant disagreements at the level of concepts and mech
anisms. Studies that directly analyze the consequences of targeting civilians in counterinsurgency warfare either dispute the conventional wisdom or introduce important caveats. Downes (2008,37-39) points to several cases, in cluding multiple counterinsurgency campaigns, in which civilians were victimized in war by the winning side. Ka lyvas (2006) maintains that violence against civilians is an effective means to consolidate control in civil wars if it is used selectively and only against suspected collaborators; indiscriminate violence is generally counterproductive, but not always. Stoll (1993) argues that brutal reprisals by the Guatemalan military against entire peasant com munities suspected of harboring or sympathizing with the communist EGP were an effective counterinsurgency method. In the most careful quantitative study of civilian targeting to date, Lyall (2009) finds that quasi-random shelling by Russian forces in Chechnya effectively sup pressed rebel attacks.
Even among analysts who embrace the conventional wisdom, there is a significant indeterminacy about when and how targeting civilians is thought to become coun terproductive. One argument holds that killing an en emy's civilians toughens the resistance of their entire society (Pape 1996) . Abrahms (2006) provides a psy chological microfoundation for civilian resistance in fear, arguing that the intentional targeting of civilians is in terpreted by its targets as an attempt to destroy their entire society rather than to extract specific concessions.
A related argument says that targeting civilians provokes retaliation in kind that obviates the military value of the original action (Carr 2002) . Both resistance and retalia tion may be intensified by the solidarity of nationalism (Arreguin-Toft 2001) . These arguments imply that killing civilians may have a positive military value in the short run, but that it is offset by macroscale processes that react back on the perpetrators over indeterminate time frames. Empirically, much of what we know is subject to problems of aggregation. Common proxies for the utility of victimizing civilians, such as victory or defeat, war du ration, or costs, depend on many factors. Victimization of civilians by the state may damage insurgent movements that emerge victorious in the long run, or it may push civilians to ally with insurgents who lose for other rea sons. Most worrisome, states or insurgents may opt to target civilians precisely when escalating costs, lengthen ing war duration, or the course of events begin to put victory in doubt.2 Reviewing a vast body of descriptive literature on civil wars, Kalyvas (2006,146-72) The results consistently show that bombing was counterproductive as a counterinsurgency practice. Higher frequencies of bombing correspond unambigu ously to higher levels of downstream control by the Viet Cong. These findings hold up across a range of models and specifications designed specifically to address prob lems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity.
Our findings are the most rigorous evidence avail able that the victimization of civilians undermines 2 Downes (2006 2 Downes ( , 2008 shows that precisely such attrition dynam ics drive states' decisions to victimize civilians in interstate wars.
Similarly, Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) show that mass killing in guerrilla wars becomes more prevalent as the mili tary threat to the state grows. The difficulties of identifying causal effects in this context imply that it is unrealistic to assume mil itary actors can accurately predict the consequences of targeting civilians.
counterinsurgency efforts. They demonstrate just how much the success of counterinsurgency depends on the methods with which it is fought; tactics that run a high risk of victimizing civilians are likely to rebound against their users. Our findings also contribute a new within-country focus to the cross-national and macroscale literature on the use of strategic bombing to achieve political goals (Allen 2007; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Pape 1996) . The local effects of bombing are poorly understood in this literature, yet they play a central role in the literature's causal claims. Methodologically, our article illustrates the utility-and the challenges-of within-country research strategies in studying violence in civil wars (Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 2004) . Case studies alone are insufficient, for in surgents and incumbents alike respond to changing con ditions, and strategies of violence are both the product of previous developments and the causes of subsequent ones. Untangling the direction of causality is no easy task, but we show that careful attention to the logic of inference yields powerful findings.
We begin by discussing the microfoundations of civil ian targeting in the context of insurgency and the theo retical debate about its effects. We then provide historical context for our analysis and present our data. We analyze the effects of bombing using several approaches, and we conclude.
Insurgency and Indiscriminate

Violence
Most wars generate civilian casualties. Insurgency, how ever, is a technology of rebellion that implicates civil ians more directly in the process of warfare than conventional forms of conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) . The key descriptive feature of insurgency is asym metry: the state fields large, relatively well-equipped, regular military forces against a smaller force of less well-equipped rebels organized as irregulars. The rebels avoid large-scale and sustained confrontations due to the state's material advantages. Consequently, battles, espe cially large or decisive ones, are rare; front lines do not form. Insurgents attempt to organize the civilian popula tion, mainly in the countryside, as a means to gradually build up forces sufficient to take over the state or to de tach a portion of its territory. Given their inability to draw insurgents into sustained combat, the state must compete with insurgents for control over the population.
Active collaboration by civilians is a vital resource for both insurgents and state forces. The behavior of civil ians is highly constrained in insurgencies, but they often have substantial scope for choice as to the extent of their collaboration with the dominant local actor (Weinstein 2006; Wood 2003) .
One way to influence civilian behavior is through vi olence, which sets insurgency apart from normal politics and constitutes it as a form of warfare. Violence against civilians is a central feature of such conflicts. It is generally assumed that civilians will try to avoid being victimized, but this insight alone entails indeterminate predictions.
Violence may plausibly terrorize civilians into compli ance, or it may push them to align with the insurgency.
To overcome this indeterminacy, Kalyvas (2006, 141-45) distinguishes between "selective" violence, in which tar gets are chosen on the basis of individualized suspicion, Aggregating over long time periods (the duration of wars, for instance), or large geographical or political units, will in general make it difficult to disentangle the range of causal processes that may be at work in a given conflict.
Our approach has two major advantages that com plement existing studies. First, we systematically examine the local effects of indiscriminate violence on very small population units that were continuously measured over a relatively short duration (six months). Second, we mea sure local control, which is the immediate objective of rebel and state forces, as our dependent variable, rather than insurgent violence. Low levels of insurgent violence in a given area are consistent with both complete insurgent control and complete incumbent control (in the former case, because rebels have no need for it; in the latter case, because their access is limited). High levels of insurgent violence may indicate an insurgency that is gaining or los ing strength. Our use of control as the dependent variable is a second plausible reason why our results diverge from those of Lyall (2009), who instead examines the effect of indiscriminate violence on subsequent insurgent attacks.
We believe our variable is more appropriate to the task at hand. The exercise of territorial control over a commu nity is a much more precise way of assessing insurgents' strength than their ability to launch attacks in the vicinity of that community. operations were directed at targets within South Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, not, as com monly believed, at North Vietnam" (Thayer 1985, 79) . According to Littauer and Uphoffs (1972) wartime esti mates, 62% of the bomb tonnage dropped in Indochina from 1965 to 1971 fell on South Vietnam. Schlight (1994) estimates that 75% of all aerial missions in Indochina were flown over South Vietnam.
Bombing and Its Context in South
The effects of bombing on the population of Vietnam and the intentions behind it were controversial subjects during the war, and they remain key objects of histori cal polemics to this day. A simple account is elusive. As with much of the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency in Vietnam, practices varied among commanders and evolved over time. Despite the lack of a systematic Air Force counterinsurgency doctrine until several years into the conflict (Drew 1998) , the use of air power in Vietnam was lavish: "air forces" accounted for as much as 47% of the combined annual military budget of the United States and South Vietnam in 1969 (Thayer 1985, 25) .
Several histories of the war argue that the bombing of civilians was a systematic and intentional component of U.S. strategy, designed to terrorize civilians out of col laboration with the VC (Fitzgerald 1989; Gibson 1986 ).
Since the war, no direct evidence has come to light that supports this conclusion for South Vietnam as a whole, though some units may have practiced terror bombing unofficially. Some fairly direct evidence supports the lat ter conclusion, such as the text of a leaflet that was dropped in some areas of the South: "When the plane returns to sow death, you will have no more time to choose. Be sure to follow the example of 70,000 compatriots who have used the free-movement pass to return and re-establish a comfortable life in peace; or stay and die in suffering and horrible danger. All who stay will never be able to know when other bombs will fall. Be sure to be wise and don't be undecided any more..." (Littauer and Uphoff 1972, 60) .
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many commanders welcomed the bombing of civilians even if they could not directly order it. Writes R. W. Apple, "An army general explained the idea to me as follows: 'You've got to dry up the sea the guerrillas swim in-that's the peasants and the best way to do that is to blast the hell out of their villages so they'll come into our refugee camps. No vil lages, no guerrillas: simple '" (1971,449) . General William Westmoreland, as head of U.S. operations in Vietnam, was famously unconcerned with civilian casualties, remarking that the air war "does deprive the enemy of population, doesn't it?" (Halberstam 1972, 550) .
U.S. Rules of Engagement (ROEs) issued during the war are consistent with the view that civilians were fre quently bombed in spite of the absence of a specific command-level intent to systematically kill or terrorize them. According to a summary of the ROEs prepared for congressional testimony, all U.S. airstrikes required the approval of the local Vietnamese province chief or a higher official. In practice, multiple sources confirm that approval was easy to obtain. Airstrikes close to populated hamlets had to be directed by a Forward Air Controller or an alternative observer. Unless carried out "in con junction with an immediate ground operation," the in habitants had to receive prior warning of the strike. The ROEs were relaxed for "Specified Strikes Zones," the offi cial military jargon for so-called "free-fire zones," places "where no friendly forces or populace existed" (Congres sional Record 1985) . In short, even direct bombardment of populated places was not prohibited, though it was restricted.
How common was it? One indication is given by Thayer (1985, 130-32) , who shows that about 23% of the South Vietnamese population lived within 3 km. of at least one airstrike in January 1969.6 Although it is not possible to estimate civilian casualties from these figures, they must have been substantial. Race comments on the ROEs, "Despite these rules, however, heavy civilian ca sualties still occurred" (1972, 233), a conclusion echoed by Elliott (2003) . Given the technology of the times, a heavy civilian death toll followed directly from the choice to use air power in populated areas. Lewy The HES identified a median of 36 hamlets per district in 1969. One might analogize the problem a DSA faced to that of the sheriff of a small U.S. county trying to identify dangerous towns or neighborhoods in his or her juris diction. For more information about DSAs, see Bole and Kobata (1975) .
The questionnaires were resolved into a series of "level 1 models," ordinal indices that were intended to capture specific dimensions of pacification. Level 1 mod els were combined into level 2 and higher models, eventu ally resulting in a single pacification rating that was widely The CACTA was assembled from postflight pilot debriefs conducted on the day of each sortie.
We mapped bombing sorties onto hamlets over the full territory of the country using a GIS. An illustration of the procedure we used is given in Map 1 (the base map is of Cai Be district, in Binh Tircmg Province). The large circles represent search radii of 2 km. around ham let centers. The triangles are bombing sorties. We used this procedure to create a variable that counts the num ber of sorties that attacked within the search radius of each hamlet [Bombed (count)]; we also created a binary variable indicating whether the hamlet was bombed or not [Bombed (binary) ]. This procedure entails that a sin gle sortie may be treated as "striking" multiple hamlets. Given that our hamlet data do not describe the exten sion or shape of individual hamlets (all are represented as points), that bombing sorties dropped multiple weapons from multiple aircraft, and that the technology of the time was far from pinpoint accuracy, we believe the 2 km.
radius is a reasonable simplification of a highly complex 8 Vietnamese villages were bounded territorial units that covered the entire land area of the country; hamlets were clusters of dwellings. The data are described in CORDS/RAD (1971). intertemporal change in control, and virtually no bomb ing close to hamlets; in short, it lacks the variation need for empirical leverage. By contrast, in 1969 c trol over rural South Vietnam was still sharply divid between the two sides. Counterinsurgency appeared be succeeding (Davidson 1988, 610-12; Goodman 197 Sorley 1999, 154-60; Tran 1980, 16-25 variables models presented below for search radii of 1.5 km. and 2.5 km. Our findings were confirmed for all models; the effect of bombing was somewhat weaker in substantive terms for a 2.5 km. radius, but quite a bit stronger for a 1.5 km. radius. These results are available upon request to the authors.
occasioned by Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy (FitzGer ald 1989, 508-11) . Late 1969 is accordingly a propitious time frame to examine the effect of bombing on insur gent control, for this period witnessed (1) a lull in the ground war, (2) apparent counterinsurgency success, and (3) continued high levels of bombing.
The short time frame of our study raises two method ological issues: (1) The HES has been the object of intense criticism beginning during the war itself (see, e.g., Elliott 2003; Gibson 1986; Kolko 1985; Race 1972; Thayer 1985) . The principal critique is that the data were biased in favor of the United States to justify or rationalize its conduct of the war. Nevertheless, we have several reasons for confi dence in our use of the data. First, inflation in the number of hamlets under government control should not affect our results because we examine only variation among cases that were coded in similar ways; we make no in ference about absolute levels of control. This variation is substantial: many hamlets were coded as falling un der Viet Cong control for months or years; many were regarded as stably controlled by the Vietnamese govern ment; and many shifted among categories, in some cases several times in either direction. In any case, general in flation would tend to bias regression coefficients toward zero, making it less likely we would find any effect. Second, the data on control and the data on bombing were not col lected by the same agencies, so it would have been difficult How, then, do we distinguish between locales that were bombed because they were controlled by the insurgents and locales that became insurgent controlled because they were bombed? Table 1 In all five of the major columns, hamlets bombed in September were more likely to move toward insurgent control, and less likely to move toward incumbent con trol, by December than hamlets that were not bombed. Consider, for instance, hamlets that were under "mod erate insurgent control" in July 1969. Within this group, nearly 50% of the unbombed hamlets were rated con tested or under moderate/high government control six 12 We use September as the month for bombing to maintain consis tency with our parametric analyses. The contingency table results are similar for bombing measured in July and August (somewhat weaker for July, somewhat stronger for August). Cells contain the estimated change in the expected probability of being in a specified control level in December, by initial control July, as bombing sortie count changes from 0 to 10: Pr(Y =j | bombed = 10, control = k) -Pr(Y -j | bombed = 0, control = k), wh indexes control in December, k indexes control in July. Estimates whose 95% confidence interval excludes zero are bold. Negative in probability are shaded. All other variables are held at their means. The estimates are from Model 2D.
control. The second column (Model 2B) introduces the district-level average control status in July, which is an extremely powerful predictor of control six months later, confirming our intuition that regional control reflects the capacity to influence local control over time. Model 2C substitutes the change in district average control between July and September, which also has a powerful association with downstream control. Model 2D introduces several structural control variables. Development level, rough terrain, and hamlet size are also statistically significant predictors of control status. The coefficient for bombing remains highly and statistically significant in all models. Table 3 , generated using Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003) , gives the predicted differences in the probability that a hamlet bombed 10 times versus one not bombed at all fell into each one of the control categories in Decem ber, conditional on its control status in July (the proba bilities are derived from Model 2D). Negative differences are shaded, and estimates that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level are bold. The overall pattern is consistent with bombing having decreased the RVN's ability to control hamlets. The negative signs on the first differences on the upper right-hand side of the matrix indicate that bombed hamlets that were previously un der government control were more likely to move to ward insurgent control than were unbombed hamlets, 
Testing for Causality: Instrumental Variables and Genetic Matching
Despite the strength of our evidence, we must still worry that our initial findings reflect more complex dynamics.
It is possible that unobserved factors both increased the frequency with which some hamlets were bombed and facilitated VC control in those same hamlets. Likewise, it is possible that bombing increased in places where the in cumbents anticipated insurgent offensives. In either case, it would be incorrect to attribute shifts in control to the bombing itself.
We employ two techniques to tackle these problems:
instrumental variables and matching. Both confront the inferential problems that arise when observational data are used to derive causal inferences, but in different ways.
Consistent results using both methods will indicate that neither endogeneity nor unobserved variables drive our results.
Strategy One: Instrumental Variables
Our first strategy exploits the temporal dimension of our data to untangle the direction of causality between bomb ing and control. We use past values of insurgent control as instruments for bombing, and then study the effect of bombing on downstream insurgent control. Since we have monthly data on control from July to December 1969, we use insurgent control in July and August as instruments for bombing in September, and we investigate the effect of bombing in September on insurgent control in Decem ber. Using lags of dependent variables as instruments for endogenous covariates is common in labor and housing economics (Poterba 1991) . Our methodology is roughly akin to a generalized method-of-moments (GMM) esti mator (Hansen 1982 ), although our model is a simple cross-section.
To be valid, our instruments must satisfy two require ments: excludability and relevance. The instruments are excludable if they are conditionally independent from the error term in the (unobserved) true regression. In our application, this requires that there be no unobserved re lationship between insurgent control in July and August (the instruments) and insurgent control in December (the outcome Second, to be relevant, our instruments must actually explain our endogenous variable. We have argued above that this is likely to be the case, but we show below in a number of diagnostic tests that insurgent control in July and August are highly relevant instruments for bombing in September. Formally, if the excludability and relevance conditions are met, then the instrumental variable esti mator is a consistent estimator of the effect of bombing on insurgent control. Crucially, instrumental variables re gression does not require a full model of the process by which hamlets were selected for bombing.
We begin by examining the first-stage relationship between our instruments and the endogenous variable, bombing. Table 4 contains the results from two models, the first a baseline model with no substantive controls, and the second including a series of control variables.
The results indicate that past insurgent control is a good instrument for bombing in September 1969. All four of the coefficients measuring this relationship are significant at the p < .01 level. Shea's partial R2, a common method to assess the explanatory power of the instruments, is low All models are IV-OLS regressions. *= p < .001. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. For Wald F statistics, ** = p < .05 l than 10% IV bias, * = p < .05 less than 15% IV bias.
In all models, the effect of bombing on insurgent control is positive, and this coefficient is very precisely es timated. These results mirror those from the ordered log its above, with the caveat that since we have modeled the dependent variable as a continuous rather than ordinal variable, the coefficients have different substantive inter pretations.14 As expected, our index of insurgent control in September is strongly related to insurgent control in 14 We are not aware of any method that consistently estimates or dered logistic regression models with endogenous independent variables.
December, and Model 5F shows that insurgent control in Ordered logistic regression. * = p < .001. Two-tailed tests.
Using the matched data, we investigate this counter factual by estimating an ordered logistic regression similar to Model 2D above, with the exception that the treatment variable is our binary indicator of bombing. The results are in Table 6 . The coefficient on bombing is positive and statistically significant, confirming once again our results from the baseline and instrumental variables models. All other variables are again significant in the expected di rections, with the exception of our village-level measure of development. This is further evidence that develop ment does not appear to predict downstream insurgent control. To see the substantive effects of bombing on in surgent control, we turn to Table 7 , which was generated using Imai, King, and Lau (2007) and gives the predicted differences in the probability that a bombed versus an unbombed hamlet fell into each one of the control cat egories in December, conditional on its control status in July. We expect that bombing in September increases the probability that a hamlet is at a higher level of insur gent control in December and decreases the probability that a hamlet is at a higher level of government con trol in December. The pattern of estimated probability changes confirms this relationship. The negative changes in probabilities appear in the northeast half of We conclude with the caveat that matching is no panacea: it cannot correct for endogeneity or measure ment error. These are the strengths of instrumental vari ables regressions such as those shown previously. Nor can matching correct for omitted variable bias. Match ing's strength is in reducing the model-dependence of the counterfactual inferences about the effect of a treatment on an outcome when data are not generated via a ran domized experiment. Combined with our instrumental variables regressions, matching helps us to confirm that bombing increased Viet Cong control in Vietnam.
In both our analysis using instrumental variables and our matching analysis, the most worrying omitted vari able is activity by ground forces, which certainly shaped the outcome of counterinsurgency in the hamlets during the period of our study.20 Two scenarios are of partic ular concern. First, if bombing acted as a substitute for ground assault by U.S. or RVN forces, then we might come to believe that bombing was counterproductive when in fact it was simply somewhat less effective than ground assault. Second, if bombing were always accompanied by ground assault, then our findings might reflect short comings in the counterinsurgency tactics of ground forces rather than those of bombing. We believe both scenarios are implausible. As we discussed previously, bombing in South Vietnam was tightly restricted by ROEs that appear to have required the presence of a ground-based Forward Air Controller or an ongoing ground assault to justify a sortie. The ROEs themselves were "conditioned by the fact that in-country air activity was directed towards close air support (CAS) of ground forces" (Congressional Record 1985; also see Sams et al. 1970) . Thus, we doubt that bombing was typically a substitute for ground assault. We also think it unlikely that our findings are driven by inad equacies of ground force tactics. Were this story correct, it would seem to imply that the gains in RVN control we observe during late 1969 stem from the complete absence of military effort by U.S. and RVN forces, a suggestion we regard as implausible.
alternatives as coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2009) , full matching, and optimal matching. A table of these re sults, together with a discussion, is included in the Supporting Information as Table 15 in Appendix D. 20 It is important to note that ground force activity undermines our identification strategy only if it operated in a particular dynamic pattern, responding to control in July and August and affecting control in December conditional on control in September. Our findings contribute to long-running debates about the effectiveness of American strategy in Viet nam. We complement a body of revisionist scholarship (e.g., Sorley 1999) that argues the "pacification" cam paign waged by the United States and allied forces after the Tet Offensive was more successful than most observers believed at the time. Our results are consistent with the view that this success was due to a shift away from indis criminate violence, and toward control operations. Our analysis covers the period in which incumbent forces be gan to shift their attention to the direct occupation of hamlets and away from attempts to engage the Viet Cong in decisive battles. But even in this period of counterin surgency success, we find that indiscriminate violence through bombing remained common. Viet Cong suc cesses against U.S. counterinsurgency efforts did not re sult from a timid reluctance to expand bombing (as main tained by, e.g., Warner 1978 , or Senator Goldwater-see Congressional Record 1985 ; on the contrary, bombing hampered the pacification campaign and more of it would likely have hastened the communist victory.
In a broader context, our results reinforce and extend to the context of counterinsurgency a growing consensus on the limitations of air power as a coercive instrument, and they lend unambiguous support to General McChrys tal's attempts to reduce civilian casualties in Afghanistan.
We also help to explain why counterinsurgency remains such a challenging task with a long average duration, even for sophisticated, modern armies. Massive advantages in technology and firepower may confer only relatively mi nor advantages and may even reinforce ongoing insurgen cies (Lyall and Wilson 2009) . Methodologically, we stress the need for caution in drawing conclusions from the analysis of aggregated data and case studies. Last, on the theoretical front, we recognize that a general evaluation of the impact of indiscriminate violence on rebel activity requires the integration of several factors that have been overlooked by the literature so far (and are the object of recent and ongoing research): these include the character istics of rebel organizations (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) , the cohesion of armed groups (Staniland 2010) , the type of relationship that they develop with civilian populations (Arjona 2010) , and the political divisions they engender within those populations (Balcells 2010) . Understanding how these factors interact with strategies of violence is es sential in moving this research program forward.
